At the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th Century, the inherent weaknesses of natural law theory became manifest. For example, the object of law ceased to be conceived as being transnational by nature; national legislation gained importance in law and legal thought; and philosophical doubts regarding the possible existence of natural law and the law of reason gained momentum.138 In short, the intellectual prerequisites necessary for the maintenance of the dual idea of natural law and the law of reason were undermined. However devastating such a development could have been to the potential of legal science, the demise of natural law on the contrary showed itself to be a great boon to the status of legal science.The development of legal science in Germany serves as an example. In general, legal positivism is the doctrine prescribing that only posited law should serve as law, so the methods of ascertaining and finding law are thus affected accordingly.139 Throughout this investigation the term positivism, legal positivism, has been emp a r t v i i 598 Ius Positivum: Law as an Expression of Historical Necessities chap te r 2 2 . 1 theoret ical and hi storical orig ins 2 . 1. 1 legal pos i t ivi sm: a que st ion of law or sci ence? 138 Coing, Privatrecht 2, pp. 24-27;Wieacker, History, pp. 281-282. 139 See, e.g., Hart, The Concept of Law, pp. 302, footnote to p. 185;Wieacker, History, p. 342.
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