abling the legal scholar to gain insights into natural law and the law of nature inductively, synthetically, an insight whose intrinsic validity in turn was tested deductively by means of analysis.111 The duality of the mos geometricus thus immediately demonstrated its intrinsic inherent strengths and weaknesses. On the one hand, the argumentative force of logically proved theorems of natural law, and on the other,the weakness of a geometric system of demonstration ultimately built upon the confusion of hypothetical suppositions for axioms.112 The formalistic and analytic nature of mos geometricus made its conclusions equally formalistic and analytic, that is to say nonsynthetic, which in turn necessitated that the proper conclusions more geometrico were bereft of any material and synthetic elements. Thereby the proper application of mos geometricus entailed conclusions that were held to be true and valid irrespective of historical facts, as the method rested on the double premiss that it could a) inductively infer transcendent jurisprudential insights (that is, perform transcendent syntheses of material knowledge), and b) deductively conclude transcendent analyses (that is, perform transcendent analyses of material premisses). It was in this respect that the aspirations of natural law became unfulfilled, insofar as one was incapable of freeing oneself from the intellectual paradigms of the time (such as the inherent validity of Christianity and the dogmatic belief in the truth of the cultural canon of Europe).113 These were paradigms that, if included within a scientific investigation of an object, entailed that the value-indifference of mos geometricus became compromised, as any inclusion of evaluative elements of facts into the formulation of objective general principles, or the analysis of given premisses and a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 591 110 Röd, Geometrischer Geist, pp. 117-128; Denzer, Naturrecht bei Samuel Pufendorf, pp. 4049 and 263. 111 Denzer, Naturrecht bei Samuel Pufendorf, pp. 279-282. 112 Röd, Geometrischer Geist, p. 132; Denzer, Naturrecht bei Samuel Pufendorf, p. 283. Cf. Winiger, Das rationale Pflichtenrecht Wolffs, p. 86. 113 Cf. Röd, Geometrischer Geist, pp. 128-150;Winiger, Das rationale Pflichtenrecht Wolffs, pp. 267-276; Peterson, “Rechtsvereinheitlichung,” p. 30.
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