Since sensible reality is governed by factual regularity, causality rather than logical necessity, Hägerström’s position is that it is impossible to establish synthetic knowledge a priori by means of induction, since this would require that the subject actually has the authority to impose an order of strict logical necessity on a world of facts governed by strict causality.80 On the contrary, it is our valid cognition of sensible reality that is governed by logical necessity, not sensible reality itself. Accordingly, in order to arrive at even a simile of a synthetic a priori the subject must transcend the object and operate in that part of reality to which only the subject has access - that is, the realms of logical necessity where the object can be unconditionally submitted to the formal powers of the subject necessary for the construction of valid synthetic knowledge a priori. However, by subjecting the object to an entirely subjective realm of reality the object, so to speak, is moved into the brainpan of the observer, whereby the correspondence between object and subject is lost, making the determination of knowledge a purely formal affair forsaking material truth.This means that the subject’s determination of knowledge works solus ipse, making any synthetic judgment a priori solipsistic.Moreover, solipsism requires that synthetic judgments are substituted for analytic judgments. Consequently, transcendentalism assumes that the subject, on formal grounds, has the authority to construct formally valid synthetic judgments relating to the material conditions of objective reality, the sensible world. To Hägerström, this is an unacceptable scientific standpoint.81 The confusion regarding the true nature of synthetic and analytic judgments manifest in metaphysical philosophy implies that it is possible to synthesize knowledge by means of analysis.What distinguishes logical analysis (resulting in an analytic judgment) fromsynthetic inferences is that the formal analysis only has the a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 59 2 . 2 synthet ic knowledge 80 Cf. Hägerström, “Ett Hägerström brev,” pp. 88-89. 81 Ibid.: pp. 86-89.
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