which the legislators ought to conform, but eventually this defense proved to be a weakness undermining the authority of natural jurisprudence. What use were the doctrines of natural law to practicing jurists, especially judges, if these doctrines only expressed ideals for the legislator, ideals that the legislator had obviously chosen not to implement in legislation, or whose contradiction the legislator tacitly accepted? And how could practicing jurists be convinced that the interpretation and application of law was bound by the ideally true? (See below, PartVII, Chapter 2, in particular the Historical School of jurisprudence and its critique of natural law).91 During the 17th Century the scientific method in general started to be influenced by Cartesian ideas, and in jurisprudence the highly abstract, rationalistic, analytic-synthetic and systematic-deductive reasoning more geometrico became the standard for scientific legal reasoning.92 The fundamental of Descartes’ Aristotelian notion of science was that science proper was universal to its method (strict demonstration) and object (essence-orientation)93 - including an unfortunate confusion of deduction and induction as well as a confusion of is and ought.94 In short, natural law attempted to apply the scientific premiss of Descartes and emulate his mathematical ideals in its own field of study.95 a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 587 91 See, e.g., Stahl, Die Philosophie des Rechts nach geschichtlicher Ansicht, vol. 1: Die Genesis der gegenwärtigen Rechtsphilosophie, pp. 172-189; Phil. d. Rechts 2.1, pp. 136-145. 92 Röd, Geometrischer Geist und Naturrecht:Methodengeschichtliche Untersuchungen zur Staatsphilosophie im17. und 18. Jahrhundert, p. 5; Bachmann, Die naturrechtliche Staatslehre ChristianWolffs, pp. 24-31; Coing, Privatrecht 1, pp. 67-72; Schlosser, Grundzüge, p. 87; Hartung, Die Naturrechtsdebatte, p. 29. Mainly the geometric method’s influences on Pufendorf. See also Schüling, Axiomatischen Methode, pp. 110-112 et passim. 93 Kaulbach, Philosophie der Beschreibung, pp. 147-162; Coing, Privatrecht 1, pp. 69-70. 94 Bachmann, Die naturrechtliche Staatslehre ChristianWolffs, p. 27. See also Harris, Legal Philosophies, pp. 11-12; Hume, Norton, and Norton, ATreatise of Human Nature, p. 302. 95 Verdross, Abendl. Rechtsph., pp. 99-100; Kaulbach, Philosophie der Beschreibung, pp. 149 and 160-162; Röd, Geometrischer Geist, pp. 185-189; Denzer, Naturrecht bei Samuel Pufendorf, pp. 239-240. 1. 3. 3 sci ent i f ic method: gene ral trends of the 17th and 18th centuri e s
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