only introduces into positive law what is inherent to natural law. This contradiction leads to additional questions: How can incongruities such as these be explained away without simultaneously reducing the status of scientific law from one of objective and undeniable validity, to the status of a system consisting of merely subjectively valid legal principles, thus reducing natural law to a system of principles that are undeniably true and valid only to their discoverer? How could academic jurists prove their results if they lacked the authority to let their conclusions go beyond the content of the sources (which becomes necessary if new law is to be produced)? In order to overcome these contradictions the legal theoreticians tried to circumvent these problems by restricting jurisprudential productivity, allowing only the results of a deductive and analytic investigation of law to function as a valid and binding supplementation of law.Accordingly, a (new) rule of positive law produced by jurisprudence through a deduction from a superior principle of natural law could be accepted as being scientific and thus valid.This in turn constitutes an understanding of science intended to safeguard the scientific authority of jurisprudence by the contention that the jurisprudential findings and conclusions, logically speaking, only expressed hitherto unspoken truisms of law. In reality, such processes of demonstration obscured the introduction of new legal principles into natural law or positive law (depending upon whether the scholar in question tried to gain knowledge of natural law, that is worked inductively, or tried to determine the true meaning of positive law, that is, worked deductively) behind a veil of objectivity, hence, natural law contradicted its own theoretical premisses. a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 585
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