foundation, a want in philosophical authority that jeopardizes the strict certainty of the systematization and the induction. Since no principle of systematic selection and categorization, strictly speaking, is inherent to the object itself, then every system constitutes an external order imposed upon the objects, thereby making the systematic order contingent rather than necessary (hence arbitrary and subjective, rather than objective).With respect to induction, the problem is that this method, from a logical point of view, makes the illicit assumption that absolutely certain knowledge can be inferred from a synthesis of a subjective selection of contingent and historical facts. To the jurists of the 16th and 17th centuries the notion of a formal system of law created problems insofar as the prevailing opinion seems to have been that the formal system is only valid insofar as it does not describe a static order of things, but instead describes the principles for a dynamic order - that is, the order of the foreseeable rearrangement of things, and those regularities according to which objects move (in this case describe how legal categories and rules relate to one another).82 As a matter of consequence, the systemper se does not provide an objective account of law as it is, but provides a subjective account of how the rules of law relate to one another from the point of view of a specific subject. Furthermore, 16th and 17th Century legal science held that scientific conclusions could not produce anything essentially new,83 which on the other hand the systematic view of legal science tacitly presupposed. Since the validity of a true conclusion necessitates that the conclusion itself is inherent in the analyzed premiss itself, that is, the source of law, then it is strictly speaking a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 583 82 See what Denzer writes about Samuel Pufendorf ’s theory of systems, according to which the system depicts an objectively valid order of things. But Pufendorf ’s theory differs from the prevailing opinion of the 17th Century, according to which the system in reality is only governed by pragmatic considerations. Denzer, Naturrecht bei Samuel Pufendorf, pp. 56-58. 83 See Schröder, Recht alsWissenschaft, pp. 92-93 and 167.
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