circumvent this problem of legitimacy, mediaeval natural law theory presented a monistic view of law, according to which there existed no real contradiction between natural law and positive law. Natural law was positive law, and vice versa. Positive law was the mere revelation of natural law, just as the Bible was a mere revelation of God’s will. In fact, StThomas Aquinas’s own distinction between lex aeterna and lex humana indicates the belief in such a hierarchy and causality in law; for instance, the ultimate reason immanent in lex aeterna is cognitively accessible to humans partly through lex divina, the scriptures, and partly through lex naturalis,62 through: “the fruit of rational human observation of an order which itself, by definition, rests upon the lex aeterna”.63 Hence, the epistemological aspect of mediaeval legal theory, insofar as one refers to a qualified knowledge of law and a corresponding system of law, directs the jurist to religious faith and rational insight. However, faith and insight suffer from fundamental weaknesses as epistemological methods, and are prone to confuse religious revelation and rational insight for objective knowledge. Nevertheless, the theoretical (theological) identification of natural law and positive law remains until the 17th Century, when rationalistic philosophy,with its accompanying rationalistic worldview, mechanistic predetermination, and corresponding conception of natural law, introduces in earnest an ontological dichotomy of law separating natural, rational law, from positive law.64 This brings the trisection of law formulated by Aquinas et al. to its logical conclusion - that there exist objective reasons for the division of law into natural law and positive law, and that the chasm between ius naturale and ius positivumcorresponds to ontological realities. p a r t v i i , c h a p t e r 1 578 62 Verdross, Abendl. Rechtsph., pp. 57-66. 63 McCoubrey andWhite, Textbook on Jurisprudence, p. 69. 64 Schröder, Recht alsWissenschaft, p. 97.
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