One of the problems left unsolved by Hägerström’s characterization of the relationship between object and subject, as well as the relationship between objective and subjective, is the problem regarding the degree and manner of “freedom” or “liberty” by which the subject’s relationship to the object is characterized.72 Hägerström plainly states that the independence of consciousness is not entirely hampered by the epistemological restraints that the object can be said to place upon the subject.73 Nevertheless, the question still remains. To what extent is it possible to let the epistemological powers of the subject act freely in the production of knowledge? In other words, how is this specific subjective liberty maintained without nullifying the principle of correspondence between object and subject? Is it perhaps by reference to the subject’s power to formulate objective or real concepts?74 In Selbstdarstellungen Hägerström attempts to define a tenable cognitive relationship between objective and subjective, by stating, first that: “[j]edes Bewußtsein bezieht sich auf etwas anderes als sich selbst”75; and second that:“[d]ie Objektivität der Erkenntnis muß in der eigenen Natur des Aufgefaßten, des Objektes liegen.”76 Hägerström thus gives voice to his object-related epistemological position, which makes his breach with subjectivism all the more manifest. If we keep this definition in mind, the reason why Hägerström’s philosophy has been called realistic, in the metaphysical meaning, becomes easier to understand than otherwise.77 For, if the subject has virtually no freedom when determining objeca ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 57 2 . 1 a problem: the re lat ionshi p betwe en the obj ect ive and the subj ect ive 72 Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, p. 5. 73 Cf. ibid. 74 See, e.g., Hägerström, “I moralpsykologiska frågor II,” pp. 98-99; “Begreppet viljeförklaring,” pp. 99-100; “Declaration of Intention,” p. 299. 75 Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, p. 4. 76 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 77 However, Ernst Cassirer calls Hägerström’s philosophy conceptual realism without metaphysical connotations. Cassirer, Hägerström, p. 49.
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