results of such scientific endeavor to serve as a guide to the practicing body of jurists in their attempts to ascertain which rights and obligations the legal subjects possess.5 This is a view of law, from an abstract point of view, that applies with ease to the jurists’ notions of their own activities. However, what is of interest is that Hägerström himself does not construe the legal order as if it actually were a magical order as such.6 What he stresses is the fact that the legal order sometimes expresses itself as if it were magical, of which the formalism of early Roman law is an excellent example,7 and how this idea, on the one hand, affects Roman law and the application of law, and on the other, how it affects modern law and jurisprudence. Hence, the legal notions of Rome make an excellent point of departure. The purpose of the historical investigation outlined in this Part is to place Hägerström’s theory of law in an historical context by comparing it with different theories and their different dogmatic notions of law, such as, for instance, the theory of natural law and the various schools of legal positivism (for example, the Historical School of Jurisprudence and Begriffsjurisprudenz).The reason for doing so is that by comparing Hägerström’s theories with theories prior as well as contemporary to those of the Uppsala School and Hägerström, it makes it possible to test the tenability and applicability of Hägerström’s theories of law and legal science as well as my own hypothesis (see next paragraph) comparing them with a reference material consisting of competing notions of jurisprudence. To Hägerström, and the Uppsala School, the intrinsic validity p a r t v i i 564 5 Hägerström, Magistratische Ius, p. 81. For the opinion of Hägerström’s contemporaries, see, e.g., Gareis, Encyklopädie und Methodologie der Rechtswissenschaft: Einleitung in die Rechtswissenschaft, pp. 9-15; Hagerup, Retsencyclopædi, pp. 34-41; Bierling, Juristische Prinzipienlehre, vol. 5, pp. 38-42; Ross, Virkelighed og gyldighed i retslaeren: en kritik af den teoretiske retsvidenskabs grundbegreber, pp. 76-77 and 106-108. And for later opinions, seeWedberg,“Some Problems in the Logical Analysis of Legal Science,” pp. 246-257, 250, and 259-261; Harenburg, Die Rechtsdogmatik zwischenWissenschaft und Praxis, pp. 42-47; Larenz and Canaris, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft, pp. 45-50. 6 Hägerström, Obligationsbegriff 2, p. 399. 7 E.g., Hägerström, Obligationsbegriff 1, pp. 35-41.
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