My initial point of departure was to provide a philosophically guided account of Hägerström’s ideas, from their philosophical basic postulates to their application to a special branch of science, law. Following this endeavor, the description of Hägerström’s formal critique of legal science must be tested against reality; in this case, the material provided by the history of law, in particular the history of jurisprudence. The emphasis of this Part of the study stresses the study of the history of legal science rather than that of the history of legal metaphysics.Though the study of the metaphysics of law historically has constituted a central element of the study of law, Hägerström’s primary concern is the analysis of legal science, that is, an analysis of the requirements for qualified legal knowledge. It is from this somewhat non-historical view of legal science that he measures, compares, and judges the different schools and theories of legal science that have surfaced throughout history. A further reason why the emphasis of Part VII is laid upon jurisprudence- ’s theoretical understanding of law is that it is in the theoretical study of law that one discovers legal metaphysics, in part as an object of study and partly as the result of legal analysis. In the practical fields of law such issues are moot and ignored, as such speculations have precious little to do with solutions to practical “What would be there to be seen from the high mountains, if there were no valley?”1 a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 561 A Short History of Jurisprudence part v i i 1 Hägerström, Botanisten och filosofen (1910), p. 66. My translation. Swedish: “Ty hvad skulle man se från fjället, om icke dalen funnes?”
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