pretation of the statue or an analogous application of it) or restrictively (either through a restrictive interpretation or ane contrario interpretation and application of the statute).566 In either case,this operation must be performed with the intended as well as anticipated effects of the law kept in mind.567 One must thus also keep in mind the fact that the jurist’s freedom of interpretation is restricted. The jurist must not only adhere to the formal rules of legal argumentation and method, but an interpretation must also correspond to the material content of positive law.568 And in either case, the judge must still use those specific social ends that the statutes themselves actually express or are aimed at resolving as the first premiss and first principle for his teleological argumentation.The judge must do so without straying into so-called objective justice, which Hägerström considered to be arbitrariness hidden behind scholastic arguments, for objective justice neither is objectively real nor exists.569 So in order to reduce the subjective element detectable in all interpretative activities, the jurist must restrict his range of arguments to those that are objective with regard to form as well as matter.This entails that the interpretation must be performed along paths that on the one hand are formally correct and on the other are materially correct.That is to say, it must be possible to derive the putative telos (purpose or value) of the investigated norm from the norm itself.The interpretative process must thus be aimed at so-called objective demands with regard to both form and matter.570 It is therefore imperative that the jurist first tries to p a r t v i , c h a p t e r 8 556 566 Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, pp. 16-25; “The Notion of Law,” pp. 74-85; “Begreppet gällande rätt,” pp. 86-87;“Svikligt förtigande,” pp. 325-326 and 331-334. 567 Hägerström, “Svikligt förtigande,” pp. 325-326 and 331-335. 568 See, e.g., ibid.: passim. In this article Hägerström sharply criticizes those forms of legal theory and jurisprudence allowing the interpretation and exegesis of positive penal law to deviate from its most basic prescript, the principle of nulla poena sine lege, in order to by means of an analogous application of statute criminalize an act of omission as if it were a crime requiring some degree of activity from the supposed delinquent’s side. See Part VI, Chapter 7, above. 569 Hägerström, “Begreppet gällande rätt,” p. 87. 570 Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, p. 31; “The Notion of Law,” pp. 91-92.
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