RB 65

that the statute itself is deemed to be obsolete in one way or another (either formally, systematically, or materially), or when the law contains loopholes caused by legislative errors.563 However, one must keep in mind that the determining factor deciding whether or not a legal loophole, the risk of an unjust application, obsolescence, or a legislative error is at hand, is always, and always must be, external with respect to the exact prescripts of positive law, because positive law itself states exactly what it states and nothing more.Therefore, positive lawper se cannot be flawed in any of the aforementioned ways - barring the exception that the material rules of positive law contradict one another. However,if a teleological perspective is introduced into the processes of interpretation and application of positive law, then those issues regarding (in)justice of the literal interpretation and application, as well as those issues concerning the flaws of positive law, are illuminated, since the introduction of a teleological perspective provides a positive standard that the law, including its interpretation and application, can be compared with a posteriori - namely, the telos of the law.This is a better criterion than the unwarranted belief that such issues could be decided a priori.564 If one assumes that the law is intended to be foreseeable and applied as generally and practically as possible, then it becomes self-evident why the sole reliance on literal methods of interpretation and application of law will be regarded as being onesided and unbalanced, and explain why literal and grammatical interpretation tends to lead to unsatisfactory results - that is, lead to counter-teleological, counter-productive and unpredictable results.565 And it is in order to avoid such results that the jurist is authorized, if not obliged, stray from the exact linguistic meaning of the statute, either extensively (through an extensive intera ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 555 563 Hägerström,“Begreppet gällande rätt,” pp. 87-88; Objektiva rättens begrepp, p. 155;“The Notion of Law,” pp. 241-243; “Svikligt förtigande,” pp. 325-326. 564 Cf. Hägerström, Stat och rätt, pp. 20-24. 565 Hägerström,“Begreppet gällande rätt,” pp. 86-89; Objektiva rättens begrepp, pp. 16-25; “The Notion of Law,” pp. 74-85; “Svikligt förtigande,” pp. 325-326.

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