custom (desuetudo and conseutudo abrogativa), or have their material prescripts altered through judicial practice as well as by the analyses and expositions of jurisprudence (provided that the latter are legally as well as scientifically consistent).543 The question is then: How is this effectuated? Interpretation of law is, according to Hägerström, a process through which the jurist ascertains the meaning of positive law and thereby determines the content of valid law, and the same holds for statute interpretation.544 Or, as Hägerström comments on Kelsen’s theory of law, according to which:“... der üblichen Methoden für die Rechtsanwendung … z. B. die Gesetzmotive, die Rechtsanalogie, der Geist der Gesetze, Gerechtigkeit und Billigkeit, judizielle Praxis und die Ergebnisse der ‘Rechtswissenschaft’ als Prinzipien für die Erkenntnis des geltenden Rechtes völlig ausgeschlossen werden.”545 There are, however, a few problems associated with this ostensibly simple statement. First, one must determine the relationship between positive law and valid law. Is positive law identical to valid law or not? According to Hägerström, the idea that valid law and positive law are identical with one another is a fiction created by the will-theory.546 According to this fiction the law is an expression of the legislator’s will, an expression constituting the whole of the positive law,which furthermore is said to constitute an all-encompassing, complete and predeterp a r t v i , c h a p t e r 8 550 543 Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, pp. 12, 18-20, and31-36;“The Notion of Law,” pp. 69-70, 76-78, and 92-97; “Är gällande rätt?,” pp. 74-75; “Is Positive Law?,” pp. 32-34. However, in a later article, Hägerström criticizes Ross’ idea that only the judge can create law while jurisprudence cannot. See Hägerström,“Begreppet gällande rätt,” pp. 62-63 and 66-71. 544 Hägerström,“Kelsen,” pp.36-37. Cf. Savigny,System1, pp.212-216and262-268.Who, however, provides a didactically better description of the relationship between statute interpretation and the interpretation of the remaining sources of law. 545 Hägerström, “Kelsen,” p. 36. My italics! 546 Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, pp. 40-42; “The Notion of Law,” pp. 104-105; Stat och rätt, pp. 20-24; “Kelsen,” pp. 20-22 and 36-37. 8 . 5 inte rpretat ion of statute s
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