stitutes purely theoretical knowledge, and does so on account of its telling the judge how he theoretically can act in order to realize and implement the aims and objectives of the law.528 The theoretical knowledge of law thus provided by jurisprudence to the judiciary is analogous to the knowledge of society that the legislator himself must have in order to be able to fulfill his own political aims.529 The difference between the judge and the legislator, however, is that while the judge is under legal duty to arrive at a decision and thereby carry out what the law ordains, the legislator is not.530 It is thus clear that the academic lawyer’s and the judge’s knowledge of society neither can be said to be of different types, nor of different qualities of legal knowledge, than those discussed above. On the contrary, their knowledge of society seems to be of an identical nature, a consequence necessitated by the fact that the two must comply with the social aims laid down by the legislator, not only when applying the statute but also when interpreting it. On account of an existing official duty the judge is bound to do so,531 while the academic is bound to do soif he wants to be of any help and guidance to the judge - the practitioner.532Therefore, if the academic’s texts are to have any legal relevance at all to the judge, and thereby constitute a source of law - albeit with the reservation that academic law does not constitute an objectively binding legal order - then the academic lawyer must apply a teleological method of interpretation when interpreting positive law.533 If the academic analysis and exposition is to be of any practical relevance to the judge, then it must be conducted with a practical aim in mind, namely that of p a r t v i , c h a p t e r 8 546 8 . 4 . 3 cong ruence betwe en theory - doctrine, and pract ice - appl icat ion 528 Ibid.: pp. 84-91. 529 Ibid.: p. 88. Swedish: syften. 530 Ibid.: pp. 85-86. 531 Hägerström, Magistratische Ius, p. 3. 532 Cf. ibid., pp. 3-5; Hägerström, “Begreppet gällande rätt,” pp. 86-88. 533 Hägerström, “Begreppet gällande rätt,” pp. 88-91.
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