the veracity of the object-related sciences in a Kantian manner.524 Furthermore, since the proper administration of justice itself depends upon the proper application of the rules of positive law, the judge’s application of law constitutes an activity that is of central importance not only to the judiciary, but also to the legal order in general.525 The issue at hand is thus one of regarding how the methods of law can, and should, be applied in the most legally satisfactory manner; an issue centered on the problems that may arise when jurists as a whole try to interpret, understand, determine, and apply positive law in a uniform and consistent manner.526 Further questions to be asked are these: How are these problems best solved? Are the problems to be solved through the creation and the existence of a set of material and concrete rules covering every possible case (cf. the codifications of the 18th Century), or solved by means of the fiction that positive lawper se is a complete system of norms covering all possible cases (cf. Bergbohm’s “umschliessende Hülle” and Kelsen’s statute positivism), or solved by means of the methodical application of existing positive law on a given case? The reason why Hägerström considered that legal doctrine had such a central role in the interpretation and clarification of (statute) law, is due to the fact that the doctrines and principles of jurisprudence (in the narrow, dogmatic, sense of the word) supply the judge with knowledge of the linguistic meaning of the law as well as of the spirit of the law (the latter in a very narrow context, as we shall see later), and it is this combined knowledge that guides the judge in his administration of justice, which jurisprudence does by telling the judge how he should act (how he is to apply force and sanctions) in order to comply with the public demands placed upon him in his role of civil servant.527 According to Hägerström, legal knowledge, seen from this perspective, cona ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 545 524 Hägerström, “Begreppet viljeförklaring,” pp. 99-100. 525 Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, p. 31; “The Notion of Law,” pp. 91-92. 526 Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, p. 31; “The Notion of Law,” pp. 91-92. 527 Hägerström, “Begreppet gällande rätt,” pp. 84-88.
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