gal dogmatics with the possible authority of a source of law is related to his understanding of the concept valid law. Hägerström interpreted this concept normatively, rather than as a question of fact - that is, sociologically518 - because to him the concept of valid law refers to the legal validity of certain acts and to the prescriptive application of a norm, but not to the actual use of force or to how the addressees of a norm actually act, that is, the actual execution of the law.519 When it comes to determining the content of valid law, factual reality is merely of secondary importance to the jurists, because to them valid law is primarily a determination of how a person should, or may, act in order to comply with the prescripts of law, and perhaps only secondarily a prediction of how a person in reality will act. In fact, Hägerström argues that the descriptive and predictive understandings of normative phenomena such as law are untenable as they explain the norms themselves reference to the actual acts and forbearances that a legal subject undertakes in relation to the same norms.520 It is thus safe to conclude that Hägerström’s understanding of law excluded sociology and other non-dogmatic sciences of law from the doctrine of sources on three grounds. 1:o, in the case of a descriptive science such as sociology, and the sociological analysis of law, describing what people actually do and think about law, rather than what they are legally bound to do (and in some instances think), constitutes a practical reason why jurists (who occupy themselves with what people ought to do) must exclude the results of the sociology of law from the doctrine of legal sources. 2:o, due to sociology’s descriptive understanding of law as being that which people actually do, the application of sociology as a source of law implies that it is logically impossible to break the a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 543 518 Hägerström,“Begreppet gällande rätt,” pp. 52-54, 62-63, 84-85, and 88-91; Magistratische Ius, p. 2. 519 Hägerström, “Begreppet gällande rätt,” pp. 62-63; Magistratische Ius, pp. 2-3. 520 Hägerström, “Begreppet gällande rätt,” pp. 88-91.
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