solutions to legal as well as social problems that society places upon them. Consequently, non-axiomatic jurisprudence necessarily is more “constructive”, “creative”, or “evolutionary” than that of its counterpart, namely rational law and jurisprudence. Hence, jurisprudence is forced to adapt and conform its inductive inferences and deductive conclusions to social reality. From a purely legal point of view, however, this is not in full conformity with the legal standards, but it helps in bridging the gaps between law and society in a scientifically acceptable manner. So Hägerström’s doctrine of jurisprudence is in stark contrast to those of his contemporaries (for example,Adolf Merkel, 18361896, and Hans Kelsen) who claim that legal science is deductive by nature, and that any legal conclusion not arrived at by means of logical-grammatical exegesis and analysis of the text fails to fall within the boundaries of scientifically valid law, and hence are ethico-political postulates rather than being legally valid and binding prescripts of law.513 Accordingly, Hägerström’s conception of lex lata is wider than Kelsen’s and Merkel’s, while his understanding of lex ferenda is narrower than Kelsen’s and Merkel’s. In Hägerström’s critique of Kelsen’s doctrine of interpretation and application of law, this observation is especially evident, because according to Hägerström, Kelsen’s doctrine is one that, apart from effectively excluding the usual methods of ascertaining the law from legal methodology, also brings legal science back to the kind of primitive legal positivism that only authorizes literal and grammatical methods of statute interpretation and application. Kelsen, to a large extent, thereby excludes the principles of modern jurisprudence and judicial practice from the dominions of positive as well as valid law.514 a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 541 513 Hägerström, “Begreppet gällande rätt,” pp. 52-53 and 75. 514 Hägerström, “Kelsen,” pp. 36-37 and 94.
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