that, taken together, led to the fixing of the formal legal system; the other commonly accepted methods were the “logical” and historical.480 The literal method of interpretation presupposes that the linguistic meaning of a norm is more or less clear, or at least possible to determine with regard only to the words making up the sentence in question, and that this meaning is then to be applied to the case in question in accordance with the sentence’s exact linguistic meaning (which, furthermore, brings about the conclusion that the ensuing practical consequences and effects of such application are of secondary importance vis-à-vis the linguistic meaning of the sentence, and that these effects and consequences cannot be allowed to influence the outcome of the interpretative operation). But, in order to have an interpretative operation carried out in the strictly literal manner, the jurist must act as if he were a machine.This, however, is unrealistic for the jurist and the judge is more than:“a mere calculating-machine.”481 He must therefore take other aspects than the merely deductive into consideration when deciding a case.With all probability, the same must also apply to the legal scholar’s scientific efforts.This marks a pronounced breach with the systemic-deductive ideal of law harbored by contemporary jurisprudence, for instance, the Begriffsjurisprudenz. The teleological interpretation presupposes that the norm in question has a telos, which for various reasons should be satisfied and fulfilled, and that the interpretation of the norm therefore must be conducted with this specific telos in mind. Provided that this is the case, then the interpretation itself cannot be conducted in a logically closed manner, since such a manner of interpretation only takes the literal and grammatical results of the operation into consideration and leaves aside all those aspects that the teleological method of interpretation emphasizes. Consequently, p a r t v i , c h a p t e r 8 530 480 Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, pp. 19-21; “The Notion of Law,” pp. 78-81. 481 Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, p. 31; “The Notion of Law,” p. 91. Swedish: “Han är icke blott en räknemaskin.”
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