ström,Vilhelm Lundstedt, Alf Ross (1899-1979), and later, PerOlof Ekelöf, presented a teleological method of statute interpretation may at first seem enigmatic.479 This is especially puzzling if one takes into consideration that a teleological method of statute interpretation explicitly allows that standards other than the strictly legal are introduced into the interpretative process as well as used as interpretative data when applying the law. In effect, this would mean that standards that according to the exact letter of the law cannot be directly derived from the sources of law themselves are incorporated into the interpretative scheme. In other words, the teleological method of statute interpretation presupposes that the content of the law and valid law, if these concepts are not identical with one another, is only meaningfully and practically ascertainable when the interpretation of law is understood as being a logically open operation or activity rather than being a logically closed operation or activity.The Uppsala School’s susceptibility with respect to interpretation must be contrasted to monistic and logically closed doctrines of interpretation, which only includes literal and grammatical methods of interpretation (see, for example, Hägerström’s critique of Hans Kelsen) as well as the systemically based, but logically closed, creative deductivity of the so-called Begriffsjurisprudenz.Therefore, by way of introduction, one may thus posit that the teleological methods and the literal or grammatical method of interpretation start from different premisses, and proceed along different paths. To start with, it must be stressed that Hägerström did not reject out of hand the grammatical or literal method of interpretation. To him this was just one of several methods of interpretation a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 529 8 . 1. 2 methods of inte rpretat ion 479 However, according to Jes Bjarup, Hägerström, Lundstedt, and Ross are scientific positivists, but since their legal theories do not satisfy Hart’s five criteria of legal positivism they are not necessarily legal positivists. Hart’s definition, however, is the exact type of legal positivism that Hägerström criticizes. See Bjarup, Skandinavischer Realismus: Hägerström, Lundstedt, Olivecrona, Ross, pp. 179-182.
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