It must nevertheless be noted that the liberty of the jurists in this respect is far from total.The first restriction placed upon the use of the additional interpretative methods is that such methods may only be resorted to if the literal interpretation is insufficient and thus must be supplemented in order to arrive at a unambiguous interpretation of the norm.470 The most practical result of such a widening of the scope of the interpretative methods is that the semantic meaning of a norm may be adapted to suit demands other than the strictly statutory, such as, for example, ethical, political, and socio-economic demands.The second set of restrictions is that the methods hinted at above are themselves, if they are to result in conclusive findings, governed by two sets of principles of an extra-legal, actually formal, nature: those pertaining to the structures of human thought (subject dependent strictures, namely, epistemological and logical principles); and those pertaining to the structure of reality (object-dependent strictures, namely, ontological and objective principles). The additional restrictions placed upon the methods of interpretation and application of law will in turn have a decisive effect on the outcome of the intellectual operations of interpretation and application.This is because if these restrictions are applied, then some of the conclusions inferred must be regarded as being invalid or inapplicable in some manner or other. Some conclusions must be regarded as being either logically invalid or untrue; some conclusions, albeit that they correspond materially to the facts in question, however, should not be applied to the case in question because if misgivings regarding the socio-ethico-politico-economic consequences of a literal application of the norm; some conclusions, albeit formally correct, lead to results that jar the sensitivities of society; some conclusions that are, however, formally correct, must be regarded as being obsolete; some conclusions, factually untrue, but as a consequence of a plethora of similarities between the rule in question and the case at hand, p a r t v i , c h a p t e r 8 526 470 Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, pp. 16-25;“The Notion of Law,” pp. 74-85.
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