It has been argued that Hägerström lacks a coherent theory of method, for example, his collected works lack a single unitary analysis of the canons of statute interpretation. In the following Chapter (8), an attempt is made to synthesize Hägerström’s philosophy and theories of legal science and method, as well as to provide a systematic explanation of the relationship between philosophy, law, legal theory, and method, thereby providing the basis to a more profound understanding of his critique of contemporary jurisprudence. Hägerström’s critique of legal science, that its conclusions and findings tended to lack corroborating evidence, material coverage, as well as internal consistency do not necessarily have to constitute an insurmountable problem to the jurist, because modern methodology allows the jurist to arrive at conclusions on grounds other than a mere grammatico-literal interpretation of a norm (which would appear to be the method most faithful to facts, and thus the most scientific method).According to the prevailing methodology from the early19th Century onwards, interpretations transcending or restricting the strict linguistic meaning of the norm are also accepted as being conclusive, and so are analogous applications as well as e contrario applications of norms.469 a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 525 Legal Methodology and Theory of Law468 chap te r 8 468 This chapter, 8, is based upon my contribution to the IVR2003 workshop on Scandinavian Legal Realism, previously published as Lyles, “Scire leges.” 469 E.g., Savigny’s canon of interpretation Savigny, System1, pp. 212-216.
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