RB 65

ces, on the one hand, and on the other, the authority to describe the legal norm (the logical and conceptual relationships between legal facts and legal consequences). Finally, jurisprudence has bestowed upon itself the authority to implement this body of knowledge in a specific case, be it actual or hypothetical. Accordingly, legal science by itself lacks the authority and capacity to create the ontological and causal basis for the legal rules themselves. Legal science is thus reduced to the task of creating a systemic context within which the legal rules and principles of positive law can be fitted into.Alternatively, legal science can act de lege ferenda by pointing out the inconsistencies within the legal system, or the detrimental effects to society that the present order brings about, and finally, call attention to the need to change the law. In other words, the authority of jurisprudence to act de lege ferenda and to propose recommendations that the law ought to be changed is conditional and must seek political support in order to realize the implementation of its ideas. On the other hand, if jurisprudence wishes to restate the law by arguments de lege lata, then it has the scientific authority to do so, namely under provision that its conclusions and findings are firmly based upon a strict application of the commonly accepted legal method.The drawback is that such a scientific restatement of law necessarily will be much more conservative, so to speak, to its nature and scope than the political recommendation needs to be, because the restatement needs maximum support in positive law as well as in the doctrine of sources for it to be accepted as an exponent of valid law, while everything needed for the politicians production of new law is an act of legislation.447 (This is especially true in penal and tax law, where the principle of legality severely restricts the freedom of creativity and construction in the legal argumentation.) a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 517 447 Cf., e.g., Kirchmann, DieWertlosigkeit der Jurisprudenz, p. 24/25. for a frank statement of facts.

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