manner, using the rational intention of the wording of the statute as the interpreter’s constructive principle. In effect, this principle can be reduced to the maxim that the purposes of the legislative act shall be applied in a manner avoiding the suppression of other more pressing and important interests.429 Hägerström was nevertheless wary of the dangers that a teleological method of statute interpretation could bring about, namely the substitution of the legislator’s intents, values, and evaluations of the statute for those of the interpreter.430 However, Hägerström judged that the merits of the teleological method outweighed its demerits.431Well aware of his own restricted mandate to influence the legislator, he recommended that if fraudulent non-disclosure were to become a criminal offence, then it was the legislator who must take action, rather than jurisprudence, for any construction of Chapter 22, Section 1 involving the criminalization of omissions to tell the truth in business dealings clearly fall outside the actual text of the statute. Hägerström’s recommendation addressed to the legislator that he ought to change the statute was ultimately based upon the principle nulla poena sine lege poenali, which expressly denied jurisprudence and the courts the authority to criminalize fraudulent acts of omission.432 Hägerström was very critical of the imperative-theory of law, as it was unable to provide the interpretation and application of law with sufficient stability and firmness.433 The reason for the imperative-theory’s lack of stability is its use of the will of the legislator as a fact allowing the jurist to arrive at conclusions that are p a r t v i , c h a p t e r 7 512 429 Hägerström, “Svikligt förtigande,” p. 326. 430 Ibid. 431 Ibid.: pp. 326-335. 432 Ibid.: p. 334. 433 Ibid.: p. 325. 7. 2 the impe rat ive-theory of law - e f fects upon legal sci ence and the appl icat ion of law
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