In “Om svikligt förtigande såsom straffbart efter 22:1 SL”Hägerström argued that the conceptual determination and construction performed by penal jurisprudence in fact had little or no authority when it came to the actual determination of the causal relationship between actual legal facts and actual legal consequences.413 What is central to his analysis is the inability of penal jurisprudence to determine the causal relationship between legal facts and legal consequences in penal law, for instance, his critique of Fritz Sterzel’s definition of fraudulent non-disclosure (an act of omission) as equivalent to active fraudulent conduct.414 What is remarkable is that Sterzel’s doctoral thesis was well received when it was published in1919,415 while Hägerström twenty years later subjected it to serious and thorough critique. In general, Hägerström’s objections were of a theoretical nature, but in particular he objected to Sterzel’s methodology;416 as well as to Sterzel’s assertion that the conceptual relationship between fraudulent non-disclosure and fraudulent conduct could be established regardless of the fact that the legislator had actually refrained from criminalizing fraudulent omissions,417 or what Sterzel a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 507 Case Study: “Om svikligt förtigande såsom straffbart efter 22:1 sl” - Deconstructing a Construction chap te r 7 413 Hägerström, “Svikligt förtigande,” pp. 334-335. 414 Ibid.: pp. 311-313 and 335. See also Sterzel, Bidrag till läran om bedrägeribrottet, pp. 96104 et passim. 415 Lamm, review of Fritz Sterzell:Bidrag till läran om bedrägeribrottet (Uppsala 1919),Svensk Juristtidning (SvJT) 5 (1920). 416 Hägerström, “Svikligt förtigande,” pp. 334-335. 417 Ibid.
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