The imperative-theory and the idea of just retribution are intimately connected to one another, whereby the ruling or imperative power must make its will and volitions positively known through its commands in order for the act of retaliation to be fair. This theory has been maintained on account of the prevailing idea that just punishment presumes the criminal’s objective guilt. The only difference in comparison to older views is with regard to the nature of the commanding personage, namely the will. In modern theory the state, the legal order, or the law itself, has replaced the king or divine power as the commanding subject of law. Characteristic of the imperative-theory is the fact that just and fair punishment or coercion requires that the criminal has incurred some degree of guilt, which also weakens the theory as every act of coercion on behalf of the legal order can only be justified provided that the object of coercion objectively deserves the a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 503 he is guilty, i.e., has deserved punishment.This punishment, then, plainly functions both as quod peccatumest and ne peccetur.”406 “But one needs such a power in order to be able to maintain the justice of punishment, and in this way one is led on to refer to the indubitable reality possessed by the legal order itself, to which the penal laws belong.The latter thus comes to be described, against all reason, as a will which has divine power, whether this is explicitly expressed or not.”407 6 . 5. 3 the impe rat ive-theory and the idea of just retri but ion 406 Hägerström, “Principundersökning,” p. 223; “Fundamental Problems,” p. 364. Swedish:“Han nedsätter genom sin gärning lagarnas auktoritet och giver dåligt exempel. Detta måste sonas genom straffet, som då fungerar som ett slags social skadeersättning. Men att denna är rättfärdigad, det beror därpå, att han överträtt lagens imperativer. Därigenom är han skyldig, det vill säga förtjänt av straffet. Detta fungerar då uppenbarligen såväl quod peccatum est somne peccatur [sic!].” 407 Hägerström, “Principundersökning,” pp. 223-224; “Fundamental Problems,” p. 365. Swedish: “Men man behöver dock en sådan makt för att kunna hävda straffets rättfärdighet och föres därvid över till hänvisning på den otvivelaktiga realitet, som rättsordningen själv har, till vilken strafflagarna höra. Denna kommer därigenom att mot all rimlighet själv bestämmas som en vilja, vilken, vare sig detta utsäges eller icke, har gudomlig makt.”
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