forces. It is unreasonable to explain the force of legal rules by means of a “real will,” because in reality it is various social interests that express themselves via legislation, which in turn entails that these interests serve as the overriding principle of statute interpretation in penal law.379 However, this conglomerate of interests cannot realistically be construed as being the actual will of an actually commanding personage.380 Furthermor, modern penal law, penal jurisprudence, and the judiciary all presuppose the existence of such a commanding will of and in society, a will whose commands must be violated in order for the just execution of punishment.The reason for such a notion originates from a sense of justice and its predilection to justify punishment and other legal consequences by reference to some vague notion of guilt (which is incurred by committing some wrongful act of some nature or other).All is decided by society, understood as being an anthropomorphic person, which undeniably is an idea that can be traced back to natural law. Finally, if penal jurisprudence makes use of similar explanations and ideas, then it too exercises notions fundamental to natural law.381 So legal theory endowed the legal order with human determinations and features, such as a will, and then raised it to the level of supernatural reality by means of a reification of the (now anthropomorphic) concept of legal order itself.The final product is a conceptual entity expressing its will by issuing commands (laws) and creating rights and duties for the separate individuals under the command of the legal order (a command that also appears to bind the supreme sovereign of the land, the legislator himself,who seems to have become the slave of his own creation). All in all, the legal order is saturated with metaphysical, mystical and superstitious ideas, some of historical and some of modern origin.The former is caused by superstition, the latter by legal p a r t v i , c h a p t e r 6 494 379 Ibid. See also Part VI, Chapter 8. 380 Ibid. 381 Ibid.: p. 341.
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