Hägerström’s use of the principle of legality as his theoretical touchstone also serves a practical purpose to him insofar as it is only this principle that can provide the application of penal law with the commonly sought-after uniformity, integrity, and predictability.349 According to Hägerström, Professor Johan Hagströmer (18451910) is considerably more careful in his investigation of the nature of the concept jural basis in relation to the state’s right to punish offenders.350However, what Hägerström avoids to emphasize is that Hagströmer distinguishes between two areas of legal science, namely between legal philosophy and the dogmatice science of penal law, penal jurisprudence.The question of the jural basis for just punishment is undoubtedly an issue of central importance to the former, but of none to the latter,351 because without any reflections upon these issues it is impossible to define the outer boundaries of the right to punish. In other words, Hagströmer held the opinion that lack of a teleological analysis of punishment made impossible any distinction between the criminal and the non-criminal act.352 However, Hägerström shows that it is by means of such methods of argumentation that the concept of jural basis, which Hagströmer argues is of no interest to the dogmatic science of penal law, should be implemented in the study of penal law.353 Hagströmer presents a long line of ideas that historically have been used both as the jural basis to punishment, and lend punishment legitimacy.Among them we find retribution, social utility, punishment understood as being the realization of a pre-existent a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 487 349 Cf. Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, pp. 150-153;“The Notion of Law,” pp. 235240. 350 Hägerström, “Naturrätt?,” p. 325. 351 Hagströmer, Straffrätt 1, p. 28. 352 Ibid. 353 Cf. Hägerström, “Naturrätt?,” p. 325. 6 . 4 . 4 . 2 Hagströmer: svensk straf frätt
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