has its basis in the assumption that the use of legal force can only take place in the case of a preceding violation of a right or of law. The problem is that positive law, to which jurisprudence should correspond, does not demand that a violation of a right or of law must precede the use of force or coercion for it to be legal.310This can be illustrated by the example of a person unwittingly being designated a deceased’s descendent and then inheriting some property.The rightful heirs can then claim that this property is delivered to them and make the wrongfully designated heir or heiress the subject of a legal action, and do so regardless of any guilt on his or her part, or regardless whether or not any previous violation of a state norm had taken place.The concept of objective norm-adversity as ageneral precondition to the execution of a court decision is thus nothing more than a constructed fact of law lacking correspondence in the sources of positive law. Hägerström’s positionwas that positive law does not require that a right, or that thelaw, must be violated in any sense of the word, positive or transcendent, for the legal machinery to enter into action, and act in accordance with the claims of the winning party. According to the analyses of Hägerström and Lundstedt, the concept of illegality, does not correspond to a substance of law, as there are no such transcendent legal entities (cf. the analysis of rights and duties). In other words, illegality is not a concept of substance, rather it is a function of law - illegality follows from law, but law does not follow from illegality.311 It is in fact the legality or illegality of an act that jurists wish to establish when subjecting an act to a legal analysis.312 Furthermore, since illegality follows from the fact that an act is in breach of the law, it is p a r t v i , c h a p t e r 6 476 310 Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, pp. 146-147;“The Notion of Law,” pp. 230-232. 311 Cf. Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, pp. 138-154;“The Notion of Law,” pp. 222240. 312 Hägerström, “Naturrätt?,” p. 339. 6 . 3. 3 summary and conclus ions : i llegal i ty
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