has acted wrongfully.A debt is a debt, and as such it shall, if need arises, be recovered by means of state sanctions and coercion.And in such case, in order to maintain the imperative-theory one is forced to disregard all facts - that is disregard the law.300 As a direct consequence thereof, guilt on behalf of the debtor does not constitute a necessary pre-condition for a legal intervention of the state.301 In conclusion, the doctrine of illegality prescribes that the state’s use of force is only legal provided that the subject of the state’s use of force has acted wrongly and is culpable in some way or other, while positive law, on the contrary, does not necessarily accord the debtor’s guilt with any immediate relevance when it comes to recovering debts or repossessing property.302 What Hägerström wished to know was this: How does jurisprudence argue in order to maintain a doctrine that contradicts the rules of positive law? Does jurisprudence arbitrarily disregard facts? Or does jurisprudence pervert the legal concept of claim? If the latter is the case, how far is this creative reconstruction of the concept carried out?303 Hägerström then analyzes the different varieties of the doctrine of illegality that were about at the beginning of the 20th Century, theories whose only justification seems to have been to serve as a last line of scholastic defense for the doctrine of illegality itself, in other words, a justification of a scientifically invalid theory. See, for instance, the doctrine of the so-called faultless wrong according to which the innocent, the mentally incompetent and the mindless, that is the actually faultless, the infant, the insane, and even a fence or a storm may incur guilt and thereby violate a rule of law.304What other reason could there be to advance such theoretical constructions but a wish to maintain and uphold doca ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 473 300 Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, pp. 142; “The Notion of Law,” p. 225-237. 301 Hägerström,Objektiva rättens begrepp, pp. 142-144; “The Notion of Law,” pp.225-228. 302 Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, pp. 140-141;“The Notion of Law,” pp. 223-225. 303 Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, p. 142; “The Notion of Law,” pp. 225-227. 304 Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, pp. 142-146;“The Notion of Law,” pp. 225-231.
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