ral nature. (The similarities to Kant’s definition of obligations are obvious).289 However,Hägerström defines the legal obligation positively (but its content is defined negatively), while the obligation proper is valid on account of its own formulation.290 Hägerström’s investigation addresses the issue of whether or not it is logically possible to subordinate the legal obligation under the general concept of obligation. If this is possible, then the legal obligation is invariably binding according to the wording of the law, and the legal obligation must thus show a number of distinctive features that correspond to a naturally acting will. In other words, provided that it is possible to subsume the legal obligation under the obligation proper, then the natural will itself, in order to gain legal relevance, must exhibit observably external positive distinguishing-marks and signs, rather than rely on unobservable and internal standards. In addition, Hägerström proceeds from the assumption that the concept of a positive legal obligation only expresses the idea of a merely external obligation - the external observance of a duty or obligation.This concept must be set in contrast to the qualified concept of obligation that demands the existence of an internal obligation for its existence, which incidentally constitutes the true meaning of the concept obligation proper - that is, an internal observance of the obligation for it to be fulfilled. Of the two, the qualified concept of obligation is irrelevant from a juridical point of view, as it is only the legal obligation that is covered by law.291 So according to Hägerström, a legal obligation differs from other obligations on account of the positive character of the former and the negative, internal, character of the obligation proper. a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 469 289 Cf. Hägerström’s description of Kant’s ideas in Kants Ethik, pp. 446-554. 290 Hägerström, Stat och rätt, pp. 122-126. 291 Ibid., pp.113-144and238-240.The latter part deals with Christopher Jacob Boström’s doctrine of justification according to which the legislative powers of the state are subject to the law of justice, (Swedish: rättslagen).
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