that mobs and gangs according to jurisprudence have a universal duty to subject themselves to the hierarchically superior powers of the state.The state, on the other hand, is not subject to a corresponding duty of obedience.276 In conclusion, might is right, for the state has a legitimate power on account of that fact that the state is legal, while the other associations are illegal.277 There is thus no reason why the exercise of power should be legitimate in one case, and illegitimate in another, other than an organization’s status according to law. Accordingly, the legality of the state’s power necessarily entails a corresponding obligation on the part of subjects to submit themselves to the state’s power, while the legal subjects are not accordingly obligated to submit themselves to the powers of unlawful associations such as mobs and gangs.278 However, as Hägerström demonstrates, every attempt to justify the state’s powers over its subjects and to justify the corresponding duties of those subjects to obey the dictates of the state ultimately reverts to the idea that certain conditions have intrinsic characteristics making them necessary.What Hägerström implies is that every attempt to provide the relationship between state and subject with an added level of justification and legitimacy beyond that of factual reality and positive law, which doctrine tries by introducing the termlegality, constitutes an attempt to demonstrate the philosophical necessity of a certain actual state of affairs, such as the intrinsic superiority of the state in relation to its private citizens. Furthermore, according to theory it is only on such grounds that the actual state of affairs gains philosophical justification, which according to metaphysical legal theory constitutes a necessary precondition for legitimacy proper.This, according to Hägerström, is a misconception of reality that constitutes the precondition for the origin of legality as a scientific idea, notion, and concept.279To a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 465 276 Ibid. 277 Ibid. 278 Ibid., p. 26. 279 Ibid., pp. 29, n 1.
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