In short, the so-called Begriffsjurisprudenz, or what Lundstedt calls legal scholasticism, over-emphasizes not only the binding force of jurisprudence (as a source of law), but also the ability of jurisprudence to construct new and valid legal concepts and legal norms, and according to constructive jurisprudence the concepts of jurisprudence, because of the systemic-deductive certainty of the scientific results, were falsely endowed with existence as well as legal validity on logical grounds.271 According to a contemporary opinion (Reutierskiöld),it is the task of jurisprudence to formulate concepts of law (concepts that are frequently of use to legislation which often makes use of concepts from legal doctrine) but this activity is bound to respect reality, real life, and positive law, or run the risk of turning into so-called Begriffsjurisprudenz (which invariably disregards positive law in its formulation and construction of legal concepts).272 However, it must be noted that Reuterskiöld, in contrast with his contemporaries, does not appear to have an excessively enthusiastic opinion of the authority of doctrine to formulate binding principles of law.273 p a r t v i , c h a p t e r 5 462 271 About the impossibility of a purely deductive jurisprudence, see Ross, Theorie der Rechtsquellen: ein Beitrag zurTheorie des positiven Rechts auf Grundlage dogmenhistorischer Untersuchungen, pp. 308-311. 272 Reuterskiöld, Grunddragen, pp. 259-260. 273 Ibid., p. 82.
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