nology idealistic in origin, this fact alone cannot constitute sufficient evidence to reach the conclusion that he remained in the idealistic camp. Another factor that must be considered is of a methodological nature. In what manner did Hägerström use the adopted terms? Even if Hägerström was inspired by Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, he stayed critical to the original ideas of Kant. One might thus ask if it was not Hägerström’s plan to adopt a few of the concepts and ideas attributable to rational idealism, doing sowithout adopting their idealistic meaning and function. Hence, it is more plausible to assume that Hägerström used common philosophical concepts, but that he altered their meanings and methodological applications rather than clinging on to a speculative, dogmatic, and Boströmian meaning, function, and manner of use, thus changing their meaning from a subjectivistic meaning to an anti-subjectivistic meaning and making use of them in a critical manner.Tentatively the working hypothesis is this: Hägerström adopts Kant’s critical method, but rejects his results.The differences between the two approaches will reveal themselves as the investigation proceeds. According to Hägerström, the Kantian definition of philosophy led to serious epistemological problems, for it held that knowledge is essentially determined by the subject and ultimately subject dependent; reality was subject dependent; and that the sensible (the object) and the consciousness (the subject) were of opposite natures.40 According to the subjectivistic and Kantian view, the sensible aspect of reality was devoid of structure. Sensible reality lacked inherent logic as a predicate for its (objective) reality. On the other hand, the subject contained nothing but structure and its own inherent logic as predicate for its own objective p a r t i 1 , c h a p t e r 1 46 40 Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, pp. 1-7. 1. 3 the cri t ique : nihi l i sm in transcendental i st phi losophy
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