omission as a matter of direct physical causality cannot possibly constitute a cause to anything, then the actual causality between an omission to act and a damaging effect cannot be proved and must either be presumed or be fictitious, and in such case the doctrines of causality, which stipulate that acts or events on account of their inherently tortious nature necessarily shall have a certain legal status, are invalid.258 The substance of this scientific defect originates from the fact that the doctrine of causality deals with the pure negation of a fact (the omission) as if it were a positive fact (an action).259 Lundstedt’s analysis differs from Hägerström’s mainly on account of its being more penetrating with respect to material areas of law, and where Lundstedt advocates that the doctrine of causality should be abolished in jurisprudence. Here Lundstedt argues that the idea of a specific so-called legal causality is an exceedingly useless notion of law, of no greater use to the jurist than it would be to a sensible farm hand.260 The only reason why jurisprudence, in stark contradiction to the express rules of positive law, still plays about with a doctrine of causation predicating that natural causation and legal causality as a general rule should be identified with each other, is that jurisprudence has been, and still is, under the spell of scholasticism, which prevents jurisprudence from critically examing its own fundamentals. Furthermore, jurisprudence, just as with theology, has a propensity to maintain its basic postulates at all costs, even at the expense of scientific clarity and truth.261 Apart from constituting a fundamental doctrine of penal and tort law, the doctrine of causality also supports the doctrine of illegality (Swedish: rättsvidrighet).This is because the doctrine of causality, lacking factual justification, allows the deduction of a a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 459 258 Lundstedt, “Kritik av nordiska skadeståndsläror,” pp. 151-152; Grundlinjer I, pp. 201202. 259 Lundstedt, “Kritik av nordiska skadeståndsläror,” p. 152. 260 Lundstedt, Grundlinjer II:2, pp. 330-331, n 5. 261 Lundstedt, “Kritik av nordiska skadeståndsläror,” p. 152.
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