tainted with subjective factors and subjective determinations; for the sought-after conditio sine qua non for the damaging event itself can just as well be one event, such as the supposed tortfeasor’s actions, as well as another, such as the injured subject’s own actions.247 This is only true provided that the intended effect necessarily can be achieved directly by means of either a positive act or event, or an act of omission, for in any other case the analogy between natural causality and legal causality is invalid.The problem that the identification of natural and legal causality brings about is that natural causality describes the causal relationship between two natural events, while legal causality only describes the relationship between twolegal events.Thus, legal causality describes the relationship between legal fact and legal consequence. In addition, what according toHägerström is an argument weakening the professed necessary identity between natural and legal causality is that any such identity lacks legal relevance as what legal dogmatics represents is neither the laws of nature nor the course of nature, but the logical relationship between the rules of law.248 In Grundlinjer i skadeståndsrätten band II:2 (1953) the well known supporter of the Uppsala School, professor AndersVilhelm Lundstedt (1882-1955), attacked the doctrines and concepts of causation and causality applied in penal and tort law.The general outline of Lundstedt’s attack was similar to that of Hägerström.249 As we shall see, Lundstedt held that the prevalent legal doctrines of causation in penal and tort law identified legal responsibility (for an act) with natural causality (between an act and its effect, damage) without any scientific or legal justification, thus rendering these doctrines nothing but legal fictions. p a r t v i , c h a p t e r 5 456 5. 2 . 3 lundstedt on legal causat ion and causal i ty in tort and penal law 247 Ibid., pp. 97-98. 248 Cf. Hägerström, Stat och rätt, pp. 8-10. 249 For Lundstedt’s acknowledgment of his intellectual debt to Axel Hägerström, see, e.g., Lundstedt, Principinledning, pp. 5-8.
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