case when a plaintiff wishes to vindicate disputed property.Once the plaintiff has been designated as owner (a legal consequence following from the fulfillment of certain requisites defining the legal fact), then he uses this title as a legal fact when he wishes to recover his property - that is to say, when he wishes to seize lawfully the disputed property from the defendant. It is thus safe to argue that according to Hägerström the termright is a generic term, a systematic (formal) concept, rather than a substantive concept, denoting every legal fact and legal consequence in a specific field of law that have been joined together (by the relevant legal authority).234 Perhaps one therefore can argue that what we actually have when we talk of rights are legal norms, rather than isolated legal entities. In conclusion, the right per se is the specific fact of itself giving rise to a certain legal fact or consequence. It is the legal condition called a right that is caused by legal facts and consequences (but never the opposite). The right is in fact a concept of law that distinguishes certain legal facts and consequences from one another, but viewed in isolation the legal right neither creates, determines, nor defines legal facts, nor causes the legal consequence to be constitutive for a right, for in such a case the right itself would be its own cause, its causa sui.235 This is not the case since the right is a systemic concept, and as such its existence is not one that is possible to infer a priori.The right can only be inferred a posteriori, since according to the systemic conception of dogmatic legal positivism the legal system depicts an actual mass of law in its formal structure, rather than creating the same mass of law.All in all, the right is just a favored position of law, which is a definition of legal rights or legal duties redirecting the attention of the legal scholars back to positive law. p a r t v i , c h a p t e r 5 452 or legal consequence, but never alternative positions. Ekelöf, “Juridisk slutledning och terminologi,” pp. 221-241. 234 E.g., Hägerström, “Hägerström.”; “The Philosophy of Axel Hägerström.”; “Nehrman- Ehrenstråles uppfattning,” pp. 594-597 and 606-622; Recht, Pflicht etc, pp. 4144 and 55-76. 234 Cf. Hägerström, “Kraftvorstellungen,” pp. 74-75 and 82-84.
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