Hägerström’s definition and use of the causal concepts of law does not differ widely from those of his contemporaries, according to which a legal fact is a fact that has legal relevance to which the legal order has connected a consequence with legal relevance.225 Hägerström’s definition of legal facts and legal consequences make them the constituent elements of a legal norm. In turn, the legal norm connects the two by categorically stipulating that according to law there shall exist a causal relationship between a certain legal fact and a certain legal consequence. By such means the deciding legal factors for the advent of a certain legal circumstance is determined. As will be demonstrated, Hägerström’s opinion differs from the general opinion with regard to the actual determination of legal causality - that is, the issue regarding the causal combination of a legal fact and a legal consequence into a legal norm, and that regarding the definition of a subjective right226 (in relation to legal facts and consequences). In connection with this, there are a few other issues that are related to the two main issues formulated above. For example, to whom does the authority belong to intervene and determine the legal causality between a fact and its consequence? Does jurisprudence have the authority to connect a legal fact and a legal consequence? Or does jurisprudence have the authority and ability to intervene in legal causality (through the creation and construction of legal facts and norms lacking a corresponding factual basis in positive law)? a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 449 224 Ibid., pp. 266-267. 225 Hägerström,“Nyare rättsfilosofiska riktningar (HT1916),” pp. 69, 76-78; Objektiva rättens begrepp, pp. 22-25, 37-39, 100, 138-139, 145-147, and 154;“The Notion of Law,” pp. 81-85, 99-101, 174, 222-223, 229-232, and240-241;“Nehrman-Ehrenstråles uppfattning,” p. 575; Recht, Pflicht etc, pp. 16-17; “Svikligt förtigande,” p. 318; “Kraftvorstellungen,” pp. 82-84; “Begreppet viljeförklaring,” pp. 107, 127-129, 140-141, 143, 145, and151;“Declaration of Intention,” pp. 306-307, 322-324, 332-334, 335-336, 337338, and 344-345; “Stat och statsformer (1921),” pp. 136-138 and 149-154. and cf., e.g., Zitelmann, Irrtum und Rechtsgeschäft. Eine psychologisch-juristische untersuchung, pp. 200-203; Hagerup, Forelæsninger over retsencyclopædi, p. 64. 226 Swedish: rättighet.
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