Hägerström directed his critique at the preoccupation of jurisprudence with the construction of legal concepts, and legal facts and consequences, at the expense of their actual support in the sources of law. By constructing rules of law out of thin air, jurisprudence not only interfered with legal causality in a manner that lacked legal justification, but also violated the basic principles of legal science, thereby undermining the scientific character of jurisprudence in general. Seen from the perspective of positive law, it is safe to conclude that jurisprudence, occasionally or consistently, has invented and constructed jurisprudential conclusions, constructions, legal facts, and legal consequences, lacking sufficient support in the legal sources to allow scientifically tenable inferences to their existence.This defect in scientific rigor jeopardized and called into question not only the scientific validity of the results of jurisprudence, but also the practical applicability of the aforementioned results. If scrutinized both from theoretical and practical points of view, it is in order to ask:What do these conclusions, facts, and concepts actually describe if they lack supporting evidence? At any rate, they do not describe positive law, and consequently not valid law. The fact that Hägerström’s critique of contemporary jurisprudence was aimed at the invalidity of the conclusions of modern a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 447 Target: The Non-positive Elements of Jurisprudence chap te r 5 5. 1 de f ini t ions ( legal norms , facts , consequence s , and causal i ty)
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