arbitrary will of the entitled subject, insofar as this will uses its liberty in order to enjoy or obtain something in pursuit of satisfying some desire or interest, thus making this determination an objectively valid norm for the practical affairs of other duty bound subjects.219 Hägerström’s analysis thus concludes that legal propositions (Swedish: rättssatser) cannot be primarily entitling; all legal that propositions appear to be is primarily binding.The definition of a right that Hägerström makes is one closely attached to legislation - that is, positivistic to its nature, and thus a function of positive law, rather than a substance of law. It is worthwhile to observe that Hägerström’s negative definition of a right, in all its abstract formalism, is very similar to the definition inBegriffsjurisprudenz, which construes the system of law as being one made up of a system of free possibilities of will to reign over things.220 However, the difference is that, at this time, Hägerström’s definition of rights is negative, since the right restrains the will of some other person.To possess a right thus entails that somebody enjoys that right at the expense of somebody’s will (which is correspondingly restricted), and accordingly the right is a reflection of a duty or obligation. One could perhaps compare this view with the description of rights and duties presented in Minnesskriften till 1734 års lag, especially the section about the legal fetter, the vinculum iuris.221 p a r t v i , c h a p t e r 4 446 219 Ibid., p. 156. 220 Wilhelm, Juristischen Methodenlehre, p. 101. 221 Hägerström, “Nehrman-Ehrenstråles uppfattning,” pp. 581-583, 585-586, and 629630; Recht, Pflicht etc, pp. 24-27, 29-31, and 85-87.
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