lytical, insofar as it wishes to remain scientific - for example, in Till frågan om den objektiva rättens begrepp (1917) and “Begreppet viljeförklaring” (1935) (“On the Question of the Notion of Law andThe Conception of a Declaration of Intention in the Sphere of Private Law”, both1953). But at that moment (1904), Hägerström’s definition of legal dogmatics was similar to that of the so-calledBegriffsjurisprudenz(with regard to analytical and systematic traits), but differed it insofar as Hägerström rejected its conceptual realism, and its inverse understanding of law and lawmaking, also known as: “die Inversions Methode.”202 Hägerström’s conception of legal science was thus rather ambiguous at this time (1904), since according to his definition, jurisprudence should, on the one hand, be practical and on the other, be analytical.The problem is that such a conception of legal science is untenable, for how can a scientific activity be synthetic, that is, unscientific, and analytic, that is, scientific, at the same time? It is his sole reliance on the analytic discourse, that is, the separation of the synthetic from the scientific discourse, which is decidedly smitten by Kant's scientific Puritanism. (However, Hägerström rejects this particular view of science in his later career). The term legal philosophy is often used as a designation of a philosophical investigation of legal values, in other words as practical philosophy, not theoretical philosophy. Typically speaking, legal philosophy examines law from an internal point of view, which treats law transcendentally insofar as the philosophical analysis of law tries, either or both, on the one hand, to determine whether the rules of positive law are philosophically legitimate, or a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 441 4 . 4 de f ining legal phi losophy and legal sci ence, and the i r re lat ionshi ps to one anothe r 202 See Heck, “Die Begriffsjurisprudenz,” p. 191.
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