be constituted.180 In this respect it must be added that Hägerström did not wish to base his epistemological investigation upon any empirical science (such as psychology, cf. Hägerström’s later works), empiricism, or on metaphysical speculations.All in all, to Hägerström cognition, knowledge, was the positing (Swedish: sättandet) of the cognitive idea’s own objective reality.181 As already indicated, Hägerström’s interpretation of Kant is non-psychological and based upon the logical conditions for the subject to transcend its own limits in the determination of knowledge, which is achieved by identifying subject and object (an idea that Hägerström later rejected in his career), but without having this act of identification to refer to total abstract identity, as Hägerström held that knowledge of such an identity itself to be an impossibility.182 Hägerström’s conception of knowledge refers to the system itself as an epistemological principle, much in the manner of the transcendentalist approach (cf. Fichte, Schellinget al.).Accordingly the epistemological foundations of Stat och rätt are such that on a general level they must be regarded with some degree of skepticism, especially since Hägerström inDas Prinzip derWissenschaft (1908) and later works openly rejected such idealistic ideas (at least in their unmodified forms). However, in 1904 Hägerström was still maintaining a decidedly formalistic conception of knowledge, identifying total knowledge with the system, which in turn functions as a determinative principle for various acts of knowledge, but the identity itself between knowledge and system cannot be abstract as such an identity implies philosophical transcendence.183 Once the metaphysical backdrop to Hägerström’s analysis has p a r t v i , c h a p t e r 4 436 180 Ibid., p. iv. 181 Ibid., p. v. 182 Ibid., pp. v-vi. 183 Ibid., p. vi. 4 . 3 de f ini t ion of natural law (1904)
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