as being the effects of a voluntarily concluded agreement,172 which in turn makes the theories of public law dependent of, as well as built upon analogies to private law, especially contract law.173 The substance of this contract is that the state has gained a right to lay its subjects under obligation. However, since material public law bases its power to lay the subjects under obligation upon the actual power of public law, that is to say the power of the state, the construction of public law theory on the basis of private law must be invalid. The existence of a contract and ensuing contractual obligations are thus irrelevant, as the state binds its subjects regardless of this fictitious social contract.174 In other words, the prevailing scientific theories of public law use fictions as their premisses, which is a scientific transgression since science, including legal dogmatics, should occupy itself with objective facts rather than historical speculations, such as the supposition of a fictive social contract.175 On the contrary, the proper task of dogmatic jurisprudence has nothing to do with the construction of legal fictions, for this is a task reserved for other parts of positive law.The proper task of dogmatic jurisprudence is to reveal the direct reasons for the prevailing legal relations. As Hägerström writes, what the fictions of law do is to formally join what has been materially sundered, thereby bringing one concept of law under another, despite their distinct and explicit differences.”176 A further topic addressed by Hägerström is the epistemological issue, which is a critical approach to science that seeks to answer the question: How is knowledge gained? However, the typical approach of legal philosophy has been the opposite, the uncrip a r t v i , c h a p t e r 4 434 4 . 2 e p i stemolog ical i s sue s in the sci ence of law (1904) 172 Ibid., p. 14. 173 Ibid., pp. 201-210. 174 Ibid., pp. 244-245. 175 Ibid., p. 15. 176 Ibid.
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