answer is that it is only a theoretical investigation of law as an existing object, namely positive law, in contrast with a subjective philosophical reflection over ideal law that will help jurisprudence make itself acquainted with the scientific gravity of its own concepts (of positive law).163 In view of the fact that the aim of a theoretical investigation of the concepts of positive lawis to establish a real and tenable principle for the formation of concepts, which in turn will help jurisprudence formulate concepts that are more than purely formal and devoid of practical value, Hägerström maintains that any theoretical investigation of the concepts of positive law will eventually gain practical relevance.164 Nevertheless, Hägerström enters a Kantian reservation and points to the fact that the formation of the legal concept (Swedish: rättsbegreppet) itself cannot solely rest upon experience, as such a naïve premiss makes the determination of concepts, formally speaking, arbitrary.165 In either case, rationalistic or empirical, what Hägerström wished to avoid was an arbitrary formation of concepts. In contrast to the mediaeval conceptual realism that Hägerström detected in contemporary German jurisprudence,166 he wished to implement a model of conceptual formation involving that the scientific determination of a concept should go beyond the mere concrete, literal meaning of a word, since the word itself as a symbol rather than as a signal, provides clues to the scientific formulation of concepts - for, as in all languages, words have their limitations, which is a fact that restricts their exclusive suitability as conceptual determinants.167 What is decisive for the scientific analysis and construction of concepts is the consistency and formal validity of thought.All other considerap a r t v i , c h a p t e r 4 432 163 Hägerström, Stat och rätt, pp. viii-ix. 164 Ibid., pp. 22-24. 165 Ibid., pp. iii-ix and22. See also Hägerström, Kants Ethik, pp. iii-xii. Here Hägerström discusses the importance of providing any scientific investigation with an inner consistency and identity, the identity of thought as well as factual correspondence. See also what Hägerström has to say about sensualism and uncritical empiricism, and their effects on the formulation of concepts, in Parts II and III. 166 Hägerström, Stat och rätt, pp. 18-24. 167 Ibid., p. 22.
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