rized as illogical, unreal, and metaphysical) - which explains Hägerström’s use of the epithet “Natural law” in his critique of inadequate theories of law.159 Hägerström starts out by identifying the lodestar for his investigation, namely positive law, for: Such a philosophically unobtrusive posture is a recurring theme of Hägerström’s authorship. Its most pregnant expressions can be found in Botanisten och filosofen,161 and The Conception of a Declaration of Intention in the Sphere of Private Law,162 where with a false sense of modesty he paraphrases the Bible, and asks himself:“Quid Saulus inter prophetas?” In other words, what can philosophy teach science? The answer to this question is nothing and everything - no material truths, but a firm basis of formal validity as applied to scientific judgments. InStat och rätt, Hägerström merely asks in what manner a philosophical investigation of a theoretical nature may be of value to the sciences of positive law.The a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 431 “… it is the opinion of the author that a philosophical investigation of law, which does not satisfy itself with more or less subjective reflections over ideal law, must, as its constant point of departure, use positive law. On the other hand, it is essential to the study of law itself, provided that it wishes to clarify its own fundamental concepts, that a philosophical investigation is conducted, which must be performed without reference to the results of a philosophical research directed at these concepts. In the following it will be shown how obvious the want of proper philosophical knowledge makes itself manifest in modern legal literature, if one at all tries to clarify one’s own foundations.”160 160 Hägerström, Stat och rätt, pp. viii-ix. My translation. Swedish: “… det är förf:s mening, att en rättsfilosofisk undersökning, som ej nöjer sig med mer eller mindre subjektiva reflexioner öfver en ideal rätt, måste taga till beständig utgångspunkt den positiva rätten själf i dess faktiska bestånd. Å andra sidan är för juridiken själf, såvidt den vill komma till klarhet i sina egna grundläggande begrepp, en filosofisk undersökning nödvändig, som omöjligt utan hänsyn till resultaten af den på dessa begrepp riktade filosofiska forskningen kan bedrivas. Det skall då ock i det efterföljande visa sig, huru kännbart bristen på egentligt filosofiskt vetande gör sig gällande i modärn juridisk litteratur, då man öfverhufvud söker komma till klarhet öfver sina egna förutsättningar.” 161 Hägerström, “B. o. F.,” p. 39. 162 Hägerström, “Begreppet viljeförklaring,” p. 99; “Declaration of Intention,” p. 299.
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