Due to the will-theory’s failure to maintain the most basic requirements of scientific reasoning - to give a truthful account of relevant legal facts - it lacked scientific character and thus ceased to describe anything real, nor to constitute a scientific concept or a scientific theory of law. In short, the will-theory in private law failed to give a consistent explanation and account of a given normative phenomena (which was partly due to the theory’s ideological background as one regarding the jural basis [Swedish: rättsgrund] for the binding power of a declaration of intention).151 Accordingly, the will-theory cannot be said to describe, by legislation and customary law, the relevant legal facts explaining why an agreement is legally binding or not. In fact, the will-theory describes something else - the philosophical reasons, the ratio juris as to why the declaration of intention should have legal effect.152 The same holds with respect to the will-theory’s attempt to explain why legislation constitutes a binding source of law, and why statutes should be interpreted with reference to the supposed intentions of the legislator and so forth.153 Hägerström thus argues (provided that jurisprudence should concern itself with positive law) that the determination of the existence of legal causality between a legal fact and a corresponding legal consequence cannot be stipulated by jurisprudence or philosophy alone, but rather by some other authority.154 p a r t v i , c h a p t e r 3 428 151 Hägerström,“Begreppet viljeförklaring,” pp. 136-154;“Declaration of Intention,” pp. 328-347. Cf. Hägerström, “Nehrman-Ehrenstråles uppfattning,” pp. 615-622; Recht, Pflicht etc, pp. 67-76. 152 Hägerström,“Begreppet viljeförklaring,” pp. 136-154;“Declaration of Intention,” pp. 328-347. 153 Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, passim; “The Notion of Law,”passim. 154 Sandström, “Axel Hägerström und der Realismus,” p. 190.
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