legal consequence are to be applied.147 It is this - the consistency and integrity of its argumentation and arguments - that constitutes the authority upon which jurisprudence rests. Therefore, if jurisprudence fails to give a truthful account of the actual legal facts and consequences of positive law, if its scientific character fails, then the jurisprudential concepts trying to describe the content of valid law will cease to constitute scientific concepts, and consequently cease to describe, as well as cease to explain, legal reality.148 It is thus necessary to conclude that jurisprudence lacks the mandate to stipulate: a) what legal facts and consequences are to be independent of the sources of law; and b) which “causal” relationships these institutional facts should have to one another149 - which, according to Hägerström is a typical error of the will-theory in private law. a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 427 147 Hägerström,“Begreppet viljeförklaring,” pp. 99-100;“Declaration of Intention,” pp. 299-300; Sandström, “Axel Hägerström und der Realismus,” pp. 190-193. 148 Hägerström,“Begreppet viljeförklaring,” pp. 99-100;“Declaration of Intention,” pp. 299-300. 149 Hägerström,“Begreppet viljeförklaring,” p. 140;“Declaration of Intention,” pp. 332333. 150 Hägerström, “Begreppet viljeförklaring,” p. 140; “Declaration of Intention,” p. 333. Swedish:“Den s.k. viljeteorien, som utgår från den rent inre viljan verksam utan yttre handling - såsom bestämmande för viljeförklaringens rättseffekt är sålunda icke en teori om det, som efter lag eller vanerätt här är relevant rättsfaktum. Utan den är en teori om en genom förnuftsrätten given rättsgrund till den s.k. viljeförklaringens rättskraft. Och väl att märka: denna teori hör intimt ihop med uppfattningen av de i livet förekommande imperativiskt uttryckta föreställningarna om ‘rättigheters’ och ‘skyldigheters’ inträde såsom förklaringar om en oberoende av förklaringen verksam vilja.” “The so-called will-theory, which starts out from the notion of a pure inner volition, effective without outward action, as determinative of the legal effect of a declaration of intention, is thus not a theory concerning that which is the relevant jural fact according to law or custom. It is, instead, a theory concerning a jural basis, provided by ideal law, for the legal effect of the so-called declaration of intention. And the following point should be noted.This theory is closely connected with a certain view of the ideas, which we find expressed in imperative form in daily life, concerning the occurrence of ‘rights’ and ‘duties’. The view is that those imperatively expressed ideas are declarations concerning a volition which is effective independently of the declaration.”150
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