of either, or both, the private citizen and public authority, into an utterance and action of the legislator alone.143 By defining the limits of jurisprudence, a positive account of Hägerström’s theory of jurisprudence can be provided. Hägerström restricts the authority of jurisprudential law-making because the doctrines of jurisprudence lack the ability, especially the authority, to decide what legal consequences are relevant for the implementation of pertinent legal facts. Jurisprudence only has the authority to act in a synthesizing and analytic respect in relation to the content of the actual sources of positive law, and to create general principles from the actual prescripts of positive law. Jurisprudence thus has the authority, on the one hand, to describe the legal facts pertinent for the implementation of specific legal consequences, and on the other, the authority to describe the logical and conceptual relationships between legal facts, legal consequences, and the relationships between legal facts and legal consequences. Finally, jurisprudence is bestowed with the authority to apply this body of knowledge to a specific case, be it actual or hypothetical. InThe Conception of a Declaration of Intention in the Sphere of Private LawHägerström appears (apart from his customary critique of jurisprudential doctrine) to, criticize the legislator’s understanding of the conceptual pair, right and duty.144 His critique can be understood as being either critique directed at the law and its content, or at the consequences of unscholarly conducted legal science. His analysis calls attention to the dual responsibility that the doctrines of jurisprudence have towards, on the one hand, the legal sources and legal order in general to maintain the scientific integrity of the formal system of law, and on the other, the principles and concepts of jurisprudence themselves.145 What is a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 425 143 Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, pp. 135-136;“The Notion of Law,” pp. 217-218. 144 Hägerström, “Begreppet viljeförklaring,” pp. 120-129 et passim; “Declaration of Intention,” pp. 315-324 et passim. 145 Cf., e.g., Hägerström, “Begreppet viljeförklaring,” pp. 135-154; “Declaration of Intention,” pp. 328-347.
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