inductively established and proved, rather than being dogmatically postulated and applied without regard to the facts of legal reality, namely the sources of law.140 Accordingly, Hägerström must have understood the inductive and deductive aspects of legal science as being congruent, one affirming the other and vice versa, as any other conception of their relationship would make the idea of law as a coherent system of norms impossible to maintain. According to Hägerström’s critique of the will-theory of private law, it appears as if relevant legal facts, at the closure of an agreement, shall be defined, described, and decided by the facts according to the sources of positive law, but not by reference to abstract concepts of law (such as the concept of a declaration of intention per se). Furthermore, it is the actual occurrence of the relevant legal facts that determines which specific legal consequences (coercive measures) shall be applied.141 This is Hägerström’s path of induction. Finally it is only when a legal fact is supported by a legal consequence leading to the realization of the intended aims of law that the Uppsala School holds that there exists legal right.142 In Till frågan om den objektiva rättens begrepp pp. 135-136 (“Notion of Law” pp. 217-218) Hägerström calls attention to the fact that the systematically important distinction between public law and private law is obliterated if the will-theory is made use of to explain the foundations of law.The reason is that this theory proclaims that law per se is derived from the will of a legislator, who either directly commands or tacitly condones specific acts, whereby every single juridical expression or act of law, every contract or legal transaction, every act of obedience or any violation of a legal rule, are all reduced from being an utterance or action p a r t v i , c h a p t e r 3 424 140 Hägerström, “Begreppet viljeförklaring,” p. 99; “Declaration of Intention,” p. 299. 141 Hägerström, “Begreppet viljeförklaring,” pp. 127, 140-141; “Declaration of Intention,” pp. 332-334. 142 Hägerström, “Begreppet viljeförklaring,” pp. 122-129; “Declaration of Intention,” pp. 316-324.
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