ponding legal facts and legal consequences of contract law.136 If the oppositewere to be true,then contractual legal facts and consequences would exist as a consequence of the existence of certain concepts of law. In such case,it would imply that the concept of declaration of intention caused“contract”,“breachof contract,” as well as “damages.”137 However, such an understanding of the causal relationship between legal concepts and legal facts is an absurdity, as it implies that jurisprudence has a role and authority in the doctrine of sources and the actual creation of law that contradicts its status according to the fundamentals of science. If we take this observation as our point of departure, then the object of Hägerström’s analysis becomes clearer.The critique of jurisprudence introduced above has a direct bearing on the theoretical foundations of the so-calledBegriffsjurisprudenzand its understanding of law as being the product of a scientifically motivated conceptual development (initiated by the intrinsic characteristics of the concepts themselves).138 If perceived from Hägerström’s critical perspective, then the concept of declaration of intention ought to constitute a general principle of law inductively inferred from the existence of certain legal facts and legal consequences of contract law, instead of an ontological premiss functioning as causative to the existence of the positive legal facts and consequences of law.139 All in all, in order for jurisprudence to constitute a science worthy of its name, its general principles and concepts must be both a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 423 136 Hägerström, “Begreppet viljeförklaring,” pp. 138-141; “Declaration of Intention,” pp. 330-334. 137 Cf. Hägerström,“Begreppet viljeförklaring,” pp. 138-141;“Declaration of Intention,” pp. 333-334. 138 See, e.g., “die Inversionsmethode” in Heck, “Die Begriffsjurisprudenz,” in Theorie undTechnik der Begriffsjurisprudenz, pp. 191-192; Haferkamp, Georg Friedrich Puchta und die “Begriffsjurisprudenz”, pp. 78-101. See also Part VII, Chapter 2.2.3. 139 Cf. Hägerström, “Begreppet viljeförklaring,” p. 99; “Declaration of Intention,” p. 299. 3. 2 the wi ll-theory’s e f fects upon the formal system of law
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