In order to explain the existence of an efficacious will fitted with the power to create positive law thewill-theory begs the question presupposing what the rules of positive law already prescribe before the law-making will itself creates the rules in question.133 Accordingly, legal science by itself lacks the authority and capacity to create the ontological and causal basis for the legal rules themselves. Legal science is thus reduced to the task of creating a systemic context within which the legal rules and principles of positive law can be fitted into.Alternatively, legal science can act de lege ferenda by pointing out the inconsistencies within the legal system, or the detrimental effects to society that the present order brings about, and finally, call attention to the need to change the law. In other words, the authority of jurisprudence a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 421 “Moreover, if the idea of ‘rights’ and ‘duties’, which is expressed in a legal imperative in the sphere of private law, has this supernatural meaning, then a person who makes a ‘declaration of intention’ within that sphere, in the knowledge that it will be effective through law or custom having the force of law, will have the same idea of ‘rights’ and ‘duties.’ He too will think of the social state of affairs, which is to arise, as a mere consequence of supernatural relationships of power. Before going further in this matter, we would point out that the supposed supernatural power or obligation, as the case may be, is a logical absurdity. It is held to refer to a reality which is elevated above the physical world.Yet, on the other hand, every ‘right’ is supposed to have as its object an advantage which belongs to the physical world, and every ‘duty’ is supposed to have as its object a certain way of acting in that world.”132 132 Hägerström, “Begreppet viljeförklaring,” pp. 128-129; “Declaration of Intention,” pp. 323-324. Swedish:“Emellertid: om vid det privaträttsliga lagimperativet den uttryckta föreställningen om ‘rättigheter’ och ‘skyldigheter’ har den angivna övernaturliga betydelsen, så har också den, som avgiver en privaträttslig ‘viljeförklaring’ i medvetandet därom, att den genom lag eller lag ersättande vanerätt får effekt, samma slags föreställning om ‘rättigheter’ och ‘skyldigheter’. Han tänker då också det uppstående sociala tillståndet såsom en blott följd av övernaturliga maktförhållanden. Innan vi här går vidare, bör påpekas, att den tänkta övernaturliga makten, resp. bundenheten är en logisk absurditet. Den skall hänföra sig på en över den naturliga världen höjd verklighet. Men ändock skall varje ‘rättighet’, resp. ‘plikt’ ha till objekt en till naturliga världen hörande fördel, resp. ett därtill hörande handlingssätt.” 133 Hägerström, “Begreppet viljeförklaring,” pp. 139-140; “Declaration of Intention,” pp. 331-333.
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